Case Brief: Bayan KMP vs. Ermita

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

FACTS:

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., who alleged that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” being followed to implement it.

KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. No, 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides clear standards.

RULING:

Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6 (a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

RATIO: Examples of standards held sufficient. – The following are legislative specifications are among those which have been held to state a sufficiently definite standard for administrative action in specific fields… “a clear and present danger,” and “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil.”

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Case Brief: US vs. Barias

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. 7567. November 12, 1912.

Facts:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.

HELD:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.

 

Case Brief: Rodriguez vs. COMELEC

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
vs.
COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

 

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective position.

Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term

In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.

Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”

The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive from justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor.

Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC granted.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

 

Held: No

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly (Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

Case Brief: Ang Tibay vs. CIR

G.R. No. L-46496  February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents

Facts: 

The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a motion for reconsideration wherein the court has considered the legal conclusions stated in Spanish language.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment of the majority of this court and remanded the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for new trial averring among other issues that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was shortage of Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made him necessary to lay off the members of the National Labor Union, Inc.

That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine Army.

That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood.

Issue:

Whether or not the issues should be properly directed, resolved or determined by the Court of Industrial Relation.

Held:

Yes, The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It is more an administrative than part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a more receptive organ of the Government.

The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Accordingly, the motion for new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance w/ the requirements set forth herein above.

Case Brief: Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 132926       July 20, 2001

ELVIRA AGULLO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

 

FACTS:

On September 30,1988 Elvira was Charge of malversation germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioner’s accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner  Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With petitioner’s admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie evidenceof conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the defense as “incredible and without basis,” the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner  Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that “no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).”

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance for the crime of malversation.

 

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction “in an unprejudiced mind. “The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt.”

Case Brief: Gonzales v. Hernandez

G.R. No. L-15482. May 30, 1961.

GUILLERMO GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

THE HON. JAIME HERNANDEZ, as Secretary of Finance and JOVENCIO FOJAS, Respondents-Appellants.

 

Facts:

Petitioner Gonzales was appointed attorney-agent of Investigation and Secret Service Division, Department of Finance. But in an administrative case instituted against him, he was found guilty of disreputable conduct prior to entering the service, and called upon to resign or be separated for cause as per decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service. In view of this, Gonzales filed a letter of resignation, which was then accepted by the Undersecretary of Finance. Subsequently, his wife was appointed for the position, and then it was transferred over to respondent Fojas; on the otherhand, Gonzales worked for GSIS.

Eventually, the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision of Commissioner of Civil Service, and imposed upon Gonzales a suspension of two months without pay. When he went to Department of Finance to report for duty, the Department of Finance could not reinstate him, alleging that there was an abandonment of work.

Lower court: Undersecretary of Finance had no right to treat petitioner’s conditional resignation as an absolute one, and that the Undersecretary’s unconditional acceptance of petitioner’s conditional resignation is equivalent to a rejection of said resignation and petitioner’s position did not become vacant thereby; that petitioner’s acceptance of an emergency position in the Government Service Insurance System is not an abandonment of the position in question, as it is not incompatible with his claim for reinstatement; that the appointment of respondent Fojas to the position of the petitioner is only temporary in nature.

 

Issue:

Was there a valid resignation? Did he abandon his position by accepting another position in GSIS?

 

Held:

  1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; RESIGNATION; WHEN NOT DEEMED COMPLETE AND OPERATIVE. — Where an an employee’s resignation from his position in the government service was made expressly “subject to the result of my appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, there is no resignation to speak of, because to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position.
  2. ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE OF EMERGENCY POSITION AFTER CONDITIONAL RESIGNATION; WHY NOT AN ABANDONMENT OF OLD POSITION. — The acceptance, by an employee who resigned conditionally from his position pending the termination of his case in the Civil Service Board of Appeals, of another position as emergency laborer in a government corporation, does not constitute an abandonment of his old position, because his temporary employment is not incompatible with his old position, and he could resign from the same any time, as soon as his case had been definitely decided in his favor.
  3. ID.; ID.; WHY OBJECTION TO REINSTATEMENT AFTER WIFE’S APPOINTMENT TO SAME OFFICE NOT TENABLE. — Where an employee’s wife was appointed in the same office where the husband was employed before his conditional resignation therefrom, no objection can be made on this account to husband’s reinstatement, since he was already employed before his wife was appointed. If any objection is to be made at all, it should be against the wife’s appointment, not his own.
  4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES NOT PROPER IF EMPLOYEE WAS NOT COMPLETELY EXONERATED. — Back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. They should not be ordered paid where the employee was not completely exonerated, as where, although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service was modified and the employee was allowed to be reinstated, the decision ordered him to forfeit two months pay and not to be given back salaries.

Case Brief: Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

G.R. Nos. 120865-71   December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and

(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

 

Issue

Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

 

Held

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.

The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.

Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

 

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