Remedial Law: Double Jeopardy

Requisites for the double jeopardy to attach:

1. Valid complaint or information;
2. before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. valid arraignment of the accused;
4. valid plea entered by him; and
5. acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.
   • Note that first jeopardy must have been validly terminated before the second.
   • In case of provisional dismissal of the first jeopardy, the concept of double jeopardy will not apply if the provisional dismissal is done with the consent of the accused, i.e., the accused himself asked for the provisional dismissal of the case.
   • However, double jeopardy may still apply even if made with express consent of the accused if it is grounded on the insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial.
   • The discharge of an accused to be a state witness amounts of an acquittal.  Double jeopardy applies.

Also, the acquittal of an accused from the criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy does not affect the right of the parties to appeal the civil aspect of the case.

However, note that double jeopardy shall not apply, despite a prior conviction in the first jeopardy, in case of Sec. 7, Rule 117, which states:

Sec. 7, Rule 117.  xxx However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.

Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.  What is prohibited is the prosecution for the same offense.  As such, double jeopardy will not apply in the prosecution of the following: a) Illegal recruitment and estafa; b) Violation of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and estafa; and, c) Direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC and violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Case Brief: Heirs of Late Nestor Tria vs. Obias

G.R. No. 175887  November 24, 2010
HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS, Respondent.

FACTS:
Engr. Nestor Tria, RD of DPWH Region V was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Obet Aclan, Totoy Ona, and Atty. Epifania “Fanny” Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. During the preliminary investigation, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria, and further asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria.

The Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ, assailing the Prosecutor’s order to dismiss the charge against Obias. As such, Justice Secretary Cuevas issued a Resolution directing the Prosecutor to include Obias in the information. The DOJ was convinced that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona.

Respondent Obias, along with Aclan and Ona, filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s resolution, to which the DOJ denied. An Information against Aclan, Ona, and Obias was then filed with the RTC.

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.  In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied respondent’s notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November 4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is “reclusion perpetua to death,” shall be taken by petition for review.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. However, the DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated.

OP dismissed the murder charge.  CA affirmed OP’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge.

HELD:

NO. In arguing that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge against respondent, petitioner invoked SC’s ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court once an information has been filed with it.

A refinement of petitioners’ understanding of the Crespo ruling is in order. In Crespo, SC ruled that after the information has already been filed in court, the court’s permission must be secured should the fiscal find it proper that reinvestigation be made. Thereafter, the court shall consider and act upon the findings and recommendations of the fiscal.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, SC clarified that the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court. However, the justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution.

In resolving the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, it is necessary to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the respondent for conspiracy in the murder of Engr. Tria.

A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.

The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.  Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the SC. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

However, SC may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.  A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt.

On the other hand, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

SC reversed the OP’s ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondent as a conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria.  

To begin with, whether or not respondent actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime.  Prosecutor’s control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse.

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, SC found no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona. SC cited the facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation as bases to incite reasonable belief in respondent’s guilt: a) Motive – respondent had credible reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest of Engr. Tria’s family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third party; (b) Access – respondent was close to Engr. Tria’s family and familiar with his work schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could facilitate in the commission of the crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her father categorically admitted being in her company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior — respondent while declaring such close personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while they conversed and shook hands at the airport. Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the authorities investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to the hospital. She would not even dare go near Engr. Tria’s body to check if the latter was still alive.

All the foregoing circumstances and from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable inference of respondent’s probable participation in the well-planned assassination of Engr. Tria.  SC therefore held that the OP in reversing the DOJ Secretary’s ruling, and the CA in affirming the same, both committed grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded facts on record which established probable cause against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 14, 2006 and Resolution dated December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86210 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 25, 2000 Resolution of then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur and directing the latter to include respondent in the information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.

Remedial Law: Evidence – Classroom Notes and Reviewer

Scope:

Rules of Court on Evidence – Rules 128-134
A.M. 01-7-01-SC: Rules on Electronic Evidence
Chain of Custody Rule under RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2012.
A.M. 06-11-05 SC: Rule on DNA Evidence
A.M. 01-7-01-SC: Rules on Electronic Evidence
A.M. 004-07-SC: Rules on Examination of Child Witness; Also Sexual Abuse Shield Rule
A.M. 12-8-8-SC: Judicial Affidavit Rule
RA 6981 Witness Protection Security & Benefit Act
RA 7438 Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation

Sources:

Ampuan Evidence Reviewer
Atty. Henedino Brondial’s Remedial Law Syllabus for the cases
Atty. Willard Riano’s Evidence for notes and the sequencing of topics

Click to Download the PDF File:

Remedial Law – Evidence Reviewer v1.0

Notes: Torts in relation to Remedial Law

Jurisprudence is rich with cases tackling Quasi-Delicts (Art. 2176, Civil Code) in relation to the Rules of Court.  The salient topics that the author was able to jot down on his notes are as follows:

In Casupanan vs. Laroya, the defendant filed a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, while the plaintiffs filed a civil action for damages based on Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.  The Supreme Court held that although the two actions arose from the same act or omission, they stem from different causes of action, which are culpa criminal and culpa aquiliana respectively.  Hence, there is no forum shopping because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.   Sec. 1, par. 6, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure is on point:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

The same case tackled the differences between the 1985 Rules and the 2000 Rules.  This is very important.  Even the author was a bit confused when he read the older cases, as the mechanics were very different back then.

In the 1985 Rules, Art. 19-32 (intentional torts), Art. 2176, and civil liability ex delicto were deemed instituted with the filing of criminal action.  The provisions of the law as to the waiver, reservation, and prior institution of civil action apply to those three.

In the 2000 Rules, only the civil liability ex delicto is deemed instituted and is affected by the provisions on waiver, reservation, and prior institution of civil action.  For all the other actions based on Art. 2176 and Art. 19-32, they are now independent civil actions which are not affected by the provisions on reservation and waiver.  Otherwise stated, there is no need to make a reservation for such civil action.

Do note that as per the current rules, a separate civil action must be filed before the prosecution presents its evidence.  Waiver of civil action may be filed anytime.  And in case of prior institution of civil action, the subsequent filing of criminal action will suspend the civil action.

Take note of Sec. 2, Rule 111, of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure as well:

Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Such consolidation of civil and criminal action applies only if the civil case is instituted prior to the criminal case.  Its main effect is that the evidence is automatically duplicated, although such filing must be done before the case is finished. This provision will not apply if you reserve the right to institute a separate civil action.

Finally, the conclusion of the Supreme Court in the same case is as follows:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

This, in effect, made the earlier SC decisions inapplicable anymore (e.g. People vs. Amistad, People vs. Navoa, People vs. Badeo, and People vs. Bayotas).  Bear that in mind, as these can confuse or mislead the reader.

Lastly, the author would like to include the following cases related to the subject matter at hand:

In Virata vs. Ochoa:

The aggrieved party may file criminal action or civil damages.  Although it is important to note that you can only recover once, whichever is higher.

Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar for recovery of civil damages arising out of other sources.

There is no identity of causes of action between a crime and a quasi-delict.

In Occena vs. Icamina, the Supreme Court held that:

The judgment of conviction in a criminal case does not bar appealing the civil aspect of the case.

Two kinds of appeal may be had in conviction:  a) accused may appeal the criminal and civil aspect of the case; or, b) complainant may appeal only the civil aspect of the case if award of damages is refused or unsatisfactory.

Active participation in criminal action does not equate to waiver of right to appeal.

In Jarantilla vs. CA:

Failure of the trial court to make any pronouncement as to civil liability amounts to reservation.  Hence, party may still appeal for the civil aspect of the case.

In Park vs. Choi:

In criminal cases, you can file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution rested its case.  If the court grants the same, the court may enter a partial judgement, dismissing the criminal case on one hand, and remanding the civil aspect to the lower courts on the other.

In Salazar vs. People, the court held the following:

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same.

 

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Disclaimer:  The author merely published his notes from the classroom discussions and recitations.  He does not guarantee the full accuracy of the data.  If you see any wrong information, please tell and the author will be more than happy to correct it.  After all, “false knowledge is more dangerous that outright ignorance”.

Case Brief: Abad v NLRC

G.R. No. 108996 February 20, 1998

Domingo Abad, et. al., petitioners
vs.
Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, and Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. is a construction company engaged, among other things, in building offshore marine structures for third parties. Petitioners were hired by private respondent. Private respondent treated petitioners as project workers, claiming that the hiring of workers was based on the availability of project contracts and was thus done on and off. Workers were hired for definite periods of time, with tenure depending on the need for each worker’s particular skills.
Petitioners had been in the service of private respondent for a period of three to ten years until their termination on different dates during the period 1973-1976. They instituted two separate complaints before the NLRC praying for reinstatement. They alleged that they were non-project employees who should have become regular employees after completing one year of service and that, as regular employees, they would have been entitled to benefits extended to regular employees under the company’s CBA as well as to other benefits enjoyed by regular employees.

In 1977, both complaints were archived upon motion of petitioners to hold hearings on the cases in abeyance. They filed the motion because at that time an “identical and analogous” case (Jose Abuan, et al. v. AG&P, docketed as NLRC Case No. RBIV-1746-75) was pending appeal in the Office of the Secretary of Labor. The Abuan case was elevated to the Supreme Court and was finally decided on July 11, 1980 when this Court denied for lack of merit the motion filed by petitioners in that case for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier resolution denying their petition for certiorari.

Petitioners moved for the revival of the cases, and the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners. He held that petitioners were non-project employees. In addition, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioners continued working for private respondent even when there were no major projects to work on. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered private respondent to reinstate petitioners.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a ruling dated November 17, 1992. The NLRC cited the case of Abuan, et al. v. AG&P which it said presented substantially the same facts as these cases. It pointed out that petitioners, like the complainants in the Abuan case, also worked in private respondent’s Poro Point Project with contracts of employment with durations ranging from 15 to 30 days. The contracts specified the projects to which the complainants were assigned. The complainants in Abuan were separated from employment due to the expiration of their employment contracts. The workers in that case were held to be project employees, and so should it be for the workers in these cases.

Petitioners assert that the NLRC should have ruled on the issue of whether or not the workers were regular employees based on the available evidence instead of merely invoking stare decisis.

Issue:

Whether NLRC is correct in invoking stare decisis and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Held:

Yes.

Stare decisis declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.

Indeed, the facts and the questions involved in Abuan and the present case are the same. Petitioners themselves did admit as much when they filed their motion to hold hearings in abeyance pending the final determination of the issues in Abuan, to avoid any conflict in the decisions in the two cases.

The workers in Abuan and the petitioners were all hired to work in private respondent’s Poro Point Project, and were attached to private respondent’s Offshore and Marine Services Division. Therein, ¾ the workers in the Abuan case had essentially the same nature of employment as petitioners.

Like the workers in Abuan, petitioners in this case also had contracts with periods ranging from 15 days to 30 days. The contracts of both sets of workers were renewed several times such that the workers spent more than a year working for private respondent. The workers in Abuan as well as the petitioners were separated from the service upon the completion of the projects to which they were assigned. After such separation, they filed separate complaints seeking the same relief: recognition of their regular status, their reinstatement and payment of salaries and benefits due regular workers. Thus the workers in Abuan and petitioners in the present case were similarly situated.

Petitioners herein, like the workers in Abuan, are project employees, assigned to work in a particular construction project. They are workers whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of their engagement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.